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We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer 
securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors 
(and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand 
securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs 
by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the 
risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these 
risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even 
without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive. Financial 
innovation can make both investors and intermediaries worse off. The model mimics several 
facts from recent historical experiences, and points to new avenues for financial reform. 
 
Keywords: Financial Innovation, Financial Fragility, Securities, Risks 
 
JEL Classification: G, G11, G15, G2 
 
 
We are grateful to Pedro Bordalo, Robin Greenwood, Sam Hanson, Anil Kashyap, Brock Mendel, 
Vladimir Mukharlyamov, Adriano Rampini, Michael Rashes, Joshua Schwartzstein, Jeremy Stein, and 















Address for correspondence: 
 
Andrei Shleifer 
Department of Economics 
Harvard University 
M9 Littauer Center 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 
Phone: 617 495 5046 
Fax: 617 496 1708 
E-mail: shleifer@fas.harvard.edu 1 
 
Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility 
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny
* 
Second Draft, May 2010 
 
 
      Abstract 
We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer 
securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions.  First, investors 
(and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks.  Second, investors demand 
securities with safe cash flows.  Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs 
by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks.  Because the 
risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive.  As investors eventually recognize these 
risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even 
without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive. Financial 
innovation can make both investors and intermediaries worse off.  The model mimics several 
facts from recent historical experiences, and points to new avenues for financial reform.  
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Rampini, Michael Rashes, Joshua Schwartzstein, Jeremy Stein, and seminar participants at the Harvard Business 
School, NBER, Stern School, and ChicagoBooth for helpful comments.  2 
 
I. Introduction. 
Many recent episodes of financial innovation share a common narrative.  It begins 
with a strong demand from investors for a particular, often safe, pattern of cash flows.  Some 
traditional securities available in the market offer this pattern, but investors demand more (so 
prices are high).  In response to demand, financial intermediaries create new securities 
offering the sought after pattern of cash flows, usually by carving them out of existing 
projects or other securities that are more risky.  By virtue of diversification, tranching, 
insurance, and other forms of financial engineering, the new securities are believed by the 
investors, and often by the intermediaries themselves, to be good substitutes for the 
traditional ones, and are consequently issued and bought in great volumes.  At some point, 
news reveals that new securities are vulnerable to some unattended risks, and in particular are 
not good substitutes for the traditional securities.  Both investors and intermediaries are 
surprised by the news, and investors sell these “false substitutes,” moving back to the 
traditional securities with the cash flows they seek.  As investors fly for safety, financial 
institutions are stuck holding the supply of the new securities (or worse yet, having to dump 
them as well in a fire sale because they are leveraged).  The prices of traditional securities 
rise while those of the new ones fall sharply. 
A notorious recent example of this narrative is securitization of mortgages during the 
last decade (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford 2009).  Various macroeconomic events, including 
sharp reductions in government debt during the Clinton administration and massive demand 
for safe US assets by foreigners, created a “shortage” of safe bonds.  By pooling and 
tranching mortgages and other loans, financial institutions engineered AAA-rated asset back 
securities, including Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), as substitutes for US 
government bonds.  The perception that these securities were safe, apparently shared by both 
buyers and intermediaries who engineered them, was justified by historically low default 3 
 
rates on mortgages in the US and by more or less continuously growing home prices since 
World War II (Gerardi et al. 2008).  Trillions of dollars of asset back securities were created 
and sold to investors. Both the holders of these securities and financial intermediaries 
appeared to be caught by surprise in the summer of 2007, when the news that AAA-rated 
securities are not safe hit the market.  It is not that investors did not realize that there was a 
housing bubble, or that home prices could decline and mortgages could default.  What came 
as a rather complete surprise is how fast home prices declined, and defaults grew, so that 
even AAA-rated mortgage backed securities were affected.  As these securities were 
downgraded, investors turned back to government bonds, and many financial institutions had 
to liquidate their holdings to reduce leverage, precipitating a financial crisis. 
Indeed, one can date the beginning of the financial crisis to July-August 2007, when 
the markets first recognized the risks of AAA-rated securities.  During this short period, Bear 
Stearns liquidated two hedge funds investing in mortgage-backed securities, the French bank 
BNP-Paribas halted redemptions in three investment funds supposedly investing in AAA-
rated assets, the LIBOR-OIS spread exploded, and, perhaps most tellingly, the asset-backed 
commercial paper market effectively collapsed.  Interestingly, bad news from the housing 
market and increases in risk premia on risky assets all arrived for several months before, with 
no noticeable market disruptions.   It is only the realization that the debt which investors 
perceived to be completely safe was actually risky that precipitated extreme fragility.  
This recent episode is far from unique in recent US financial history.  In the 1980s, 
investment banks began selling Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs), securities 
created out of mortgage portfolios and intended to substitute for government bonds.  To avoid 
a possible risk to the value of CMOs resulting from mortgage prepayments by homeowners 
(which would occur if interest rates fell and people refinanced their homes) and consequent 
prepayments on the high-yielding bonds, intermediaries engineered CMOs nearly 4 
 
invulnerable to prepayment risk if historical patterns continued.  In the early 1990s, however, 
as the Federal Reserve sharply cut interest rates, prepayments skyrocketed to levels 
unprecedented by historical standards, so even the values of CMO’s most protected against 
prepayment risk declined sharply.  The investors were caught by surprise and dumped the 
CMOs, turning back to government bonds (Carroll and Lappen 1994).  Financial 
intermediaries were evidently caught by surprise as well, and many (particularly those who 
sold prepayment insurance) suffered substantial losses.  Like the collapse of the housing 
bubble in 2007-2009, extreme prepayments appear to have been unanticipated by the market.  
A similar narrative describes what happened to money market funds in 2008.  The 
industry was originally created to offer investors a substitute for bank deposits, with slightly 
higher returns, instant liquidity, and no risk.  Because investment in money market funds was 
not protected by deposit insurance, however, these funds were engineered never to “break the 
buck” -- have their value per share drop below $1.  To slightly raise returns, money market 
funds invested in generally safe non-government securities, such as commercial paper.  The 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 led to its default on commercial paper, 
which caused one large holder of that paper, the Reserve Fund, to “break the buck” 
(Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010).  This event shocked investors and precipitated hundreds of 
billions of dollars in withdrawals not just from the Reserve Fund, but from the whole money 
market fund sector, and a return to traditional bank deposits and government bonds.  Only 
government guarantees of money market funds saved the industry. 
In this paper, we present a model that captures some key elements of this narrative.  
The model shares with the traditional accounts of financial innovation, such as Ross (1976) 
and Allen and Gale (1994), the view that innovation is driven by investor demand for 
particular cash flow patterns.  This demand allows intermediaries to profitably engineer these 
patterns out of other cash flows.  We add two assumptions to this standard story.   5 
 
First, we assume that both investors and financial intermediaries do not attend to 
certain improbable risks when trading the new securities.  This assumption captures what we 
take to be the central feature of the historical episodes we described: the neglect of potentially 
huge defaults in the housing bubble, the neglect of the possibility of massive prepayments in 
the early 1990s, or the neglect of the possibility that a money market fund can break the buck.  
We model the neglect of certain states of the world using the idea of local thinking, 
introduced by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010), which is a formalization of the notion that not 
all contingencies are represented in the decision maker’s thought process.   
Second, we make the preferred habitat assumption that investors have a very strong 
preference for very specific, namely safe, cash flow patterns.  We model this assumption 
through preferences, namely infinite risk aversion, but it can reflect psychological or 
institutional characteristics of demand.  For example, an alternative way to model such 
demand might be to consider investors who have lexicographic preferences with respect to 
particular characteristics of investments (e.g., AAA ratings).  This assumption on demand is 
not strictly necessary for our results, but makes them much stronger.   
We then examine a standard model modified by these two assumptions, and obtain 
three main results.  First, as in a standard model, there is room for financial innovation to 
offer investors cash flow streams that are not available from traditional securities in sufficient 
supply.  However, when some risks are neglected, securities are over-issued relative to what 
would be possible under rational expectations.  The reason is that neglected risks need not be 
laid off on intermediaries or other parties when manufacturing new securities.  Investors thus 
end up bearing risk without recognizing that they are doing so.   
Second, markets in new securities are fragile.  A small piece of news that brings to 
investors’ minds the previously unattended risks catches them by surprise, causes them to 
drastically revise their valuations of new securities, and to sell them in the market. The 6 
 
problem occurs precisely because new securities have been over-issued: there are not enough 
cash flows in the neglected states of the world to make promised payments in full.  When 
investors realize that the new securities are “false substitutes” for the traditional ones, they fly 
to safety, dumping these securities on the market and buying the truly safe ones
1.  
Third, in equilibrium financial intermediaries end up buying back many of the new 
securities.  But the wealth of financial intermediaries might be much smaller than that of 
investors as a whole, which limits their ability to absorb the huge supply of the new securities 
(see point 1).  As a consequence, the prices of these false substitutes fall sharply, even 
without traditional fire sales due to leverage discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2010), 
while prices of traditional securities may rise as investors flee to safety.  
The model thus delivers the basic patterns of financial innovation and financial 
fragility in a new way.  The most important contribution is to connect financial innovation, 
the glut of new securities, surprise about risk, and corresponding financial fragility through a 
unified model of belief formation.  We show that a model in the spirit of Allen and Gale 
(1994), even modified by a preferred habitat formulation of preferences but without neglect 
of certain risks, can deliver some aspects of the narrative, but not over-issuance and the risks 
and fragility it entails.  Without a deviation from rational expectations, one cannot get the 
basic idea of false substitutes: securities investors believe to be riskless turn out to be risky.   
Our model of financial innovation is related to the behavioral finance idea of security 
issuance catering to investor demand as in Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Greenwood, 
Hanson, and Stein (2010).  Henderson and Pearson (2009) study equity derivative products 
called SPARQS, which they argue are introduced to capitalize on investor misunderstanding 
of equity payoff patterns.  Shleifer and Vishny (2010) apply the idea of catering to the 
financial crisis, but simply assume optimism as the stimulus for security issuance, and 
                                                 
1 Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) alternatively model the flight to safety as a response to Knightian 
uncertainty.   Our model accounts for investor optimism and flight to safety in the same framework.  7 
 
pessimism as the shock precipitating a crisis.  Here we present a unified model of belief 
formation that accounts for the whole story.  A broader historical perspective on the role of 
neglect of low probability risks in financial markets is Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  
Our paper is also related to an important theme in the literature on financial fragility, 
namely that both banks and the shadow banking system create “private money” or liquidity 
that investors demand (Gorton and Metrick 2010).   Such creation of liquidity is usually seen 
as socially valuable, but entailing systemic risks due to leverage and resulting asset fire sales 
(Shleifer and Vishny 2010, Stein 2010).  While we recognize the benefits of financial 
innovation, we take a more skeptical view about the social value of liquidity creation when 
investors neglect certain risks.  In such a system, security issuance can be excessive and lead 
to fragility and welfare losses, even in the absence of leverage.  In this respect, our paper is 
closer to Rajan’s (2006) prescient analysis of the risks of financial innovation, although we 
emphasize neglect of unlikely events leading to over-issuance of securities rather than 
incentive problems as a source of instability.             
In the next section, we present a benchmark rational expectations model of financial 
innovation in a pure exchange economy.   Section 3 modifies this model to allow for local 
thinking, and derives our main results on financial innovation and financial fragility.  In 
Section 4, we study a production economy, in which innovation under local thinking can lead 
to investment distortions.  In Section 5, we discuss welfare in both the exchange and the 
production economies.  In the exchange economy, innovation under local thinking may 
benefit intermediaries and harm investors; in a production economy, because innovation 
distorts investment, it can leave everyone worse off.  Section 6 examines the case of fully 
rational intermediaries dealing with locally-thinking investors.   Section 7 discusses some 
broader implications of our work.  All proofs are collected in the Appendix. 
 8 
 
2. The Model 
There are three dates t = 0, 1, 2 and two assets, B and A, which pay off at t = 2. The 
assets stand for cash flows from projects.  Asset B pays R > 1 for sure. Asset A pays yi with 
probability πi where i = g (for growth), d (for downturn), r (for recession). We assume: 
 
A1:   yg >  1  >  yd   >  yr , and  πg  > πd > πr.  
 
Growth is the most likely outcome and the downturn is more likely than a recession.  
There is a representative patient and risk neutral intermediary.  At t  = 0, the 
intermediary owns both assets and sells claims on their returns. These “traditional” claims are 
a riskless bond on B that yields R at t = 2, and risky shares in A, which yield yi at t =2.   
A representative investor endowed with wealth w maximizes his expected utility: 
U = E[C0 + C1 + θ·min(C2g , C2d, C2r)],                                  (1) 
where Ct is consumption at t = 0,1 and C2i denotes consumption in state i at t = 2.  Investors 
are infinitely risk averse with respect to C2 but, since θ > 1, wish to postpone consumption to 
t = 2. To do so, investors must buy claims on A and B. Investors can however freely transfer 
resources from t = 0 to t = 1 without purchasing claims, so t = 0 and t = 1 should be viewed as 
being close together. Formally, the initial endowment perishes right after t = 1.  Our results 
only become stronger if resources cannot be transferred from t = 0 to t = 1.   
These preferences conveniently pin down the gains from trade in assets.  Because of 
their greater desire to postpone consumption (θ > 1), investors seek to buy assets from 
intermediaries. Because they are infinitely risk averse, investors want to buy riskless bonds. 
With only traditional claims, however, some beneficial trades do not occur. Financial 
innovation improves trading opportunities by splitting up the cash flows of asset A. 
At t = 0, financial claims on A and B are traded and consumption-savings decisions 
are made. Competition in financial markets pins down the price pA of a share in A and the 
price pB of a bond issued on B.  At t = 1, after portfolios are formed and consumption has 9 
 
taken place at t = 0, agents observe a noisy signal  { } s s s , ∈  of payoff y, where  s s > .  The 
signal is characterized by Pr(s| yg) = 1 – γ, Pr(s| yd) = δ, and Pr(s| yr) = ρ, where ρ > δ > γ ≥ 
1/2.  That is, s reduces the probability of growth and is a stronger signal of a recession than 
of a downturn. The latter feature is captured by ρ > δ and plays a central role in our analysis. 
Our results are starkest when the signal is mildly informative, i.e. ρ ≈ 1/2.  Finally, in the end 
period t = 2 asset payoffs are realized and distributed to the holders of the financial claims.  






Agents consume some resources at t = 0, more at t = 1, and the rest at t = 2. Aside 
from consumption, period t =1 allows investors to reassess their portfolios after observing s. 
 
2.1 Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Traditional Claims 
In choosing how many bonds b and shares a to buy at t = 0 (and thus implicitly the 
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The infinitely risk averse investor cares about his time 2 consumption only in the worst state, 
a recession. In contrast, at t = 0 the intermediary supplies b bonds and a shares to maximize:   
) 1 ( ) 1 ( max
, a Ey b R b p a p B A b a − + − + + ≡ Π .                                 (3) 
When b (or a) are negative, intermediaries are buying bonds (shares). This possibility never 
                                                 
2 As it will soon be clear, in the model there is no re-trading at t = 1, so the agent’s portfolio problem can be 
formulated as one where assets are held to maturity until t = 2. 
t = 0 
financial claims are 
traded, prices pB and 
pA are set  
t = 1 
signal s is observed, financial 
claims re-traded and new 
prices pB1 and pA1 are set.  
    t = 2 
asset returns are realized 
and distributed to claimants 10 
 
arises in equilibrium, but it uniquely pins down equilibrium prices. To find these prices, 
consider agents’ reservation values for different assets. From program (2), the investor’s 
reservation prices are equal to θR for bonds and θyr for shares. Due to infinite risk aversion, 
shares are valued at their lowest payoff.  Whenever the price of one or both securities is lower 
than the respective reservation price, the investor saves all of his wealth (setting C0 = C1 = 0) 
and purchases securities, starting with the one with the lowest price to reservation value ratio. 
Program (3) implies that the intermediary’s reservation prices are equal to R for bonds 
and E(y) for shares.  The intermediary then sells all securities whose price is above the 
reservation value and keeps the remaining ones. We assume for simplicity that: 
 
A2: E(y|s) > θ·yd  and  w >  ≡ w max[θ(R + yr),(R + yd)].  
 
The first part of A.2 ensures that, even after observing a low signal s, the intermediaries value 
shares substantially more than investors. This implies that there is no trade in shares either at 
t = 0 or at t = 1, and that the portfolios formed at t = 0 will not be rebalanced after observing 
s.  The second part of A.2 ensures that investors are wealthy enough to absorb the total 
supply of bonds even at their reservation price pB = θ·R [formally, A.2 implies that 
1 ) /( > ⋅R w θ  ]. We can show that under A.2 the equilibrium at t = 0 is described by: 
 
Lemma 1: Under rational expectations and a traditional claim structure, the financial markets 
equilibrium at t = 0 is characterized by a = 0, b = 1, pA = Ey, pB = θ·R. 
In this equilibrium, displayed in Figure 2, investors absorb all bonds, their price is 








b  w/(θ·R)  1 
   





Intermediaries’ supply of bonds is initially flat at pB  =  R  but becomes vertical after all 
available bonds are sold. Investors’ demand is initially flat at pB = θR but begins to slope 
down after all of their wealth is used to buy w/θR bonds, so pB must drop below θR for them 
to absorb a larger supply. A.2 directly implies that there is a “shortage” of a safe store of 
value; this shortage keeps pB at θR, allowing intermediaries to earn a unit profit (θ – 1)·R from 
bond sales. Investors’ payoff at t = 0 is UI = w, intermediaries’ payoff is Π = θ·R + Ey. 
After a signal s is observed at t = 1, nothing happens to portfolios and consumption. 
Investors keep the bonds purchased at t = 0, the price of which stays constant at pB = θ·R. 
Share prices fluctuate with the expected return of asset A since Ey is affected by the signal s, 
but no trading in shares takes place. In this equilibrium, it is irrelevant how consumers and 
intermediaries divide their t = 0 income between C0 and C1. 
 
2.2 Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Financial Innovation 
We view financial innovation as the repackaging by intermediaries of the payoff on A 
so as to relax the “shortage” of bonds. The intermediary carves out of the risky asset a new 
claim having the same cash flow pattern as a riskless bond, namely promising to repay R in 
all states of the world.  The amount of these new riskless claims the intermediary can issue is 
limited by the lowest possible return yr of A, since the maximum aggregate repayment the 
intermediary can pledge in all states of nature under the new claims is precisely yr.  As a 
consequence, the volume f of the new riskless claims issued in this way must satisfy: 
R y f f r
RE / = ≤ .                                                      (4) 
If f > yr/R, the new claim is risky because in a recession intermediaries cannot pay out the 
promised return R to all claim-holders. If f ≤ yr/R, the new claim is riskless: even in the worst 
state, intermediaries can repay R to all claimants. Unlike the bond, which is necessarily 
riskless because it pledges B’s riskless return, the new claim is paid out of a risky return, and 12 
 
is therefore riskless only if issued in a sufficiently low volume. Financial innovation is thus 
modelled here are as the creation of substitute securities mimicking exactly the cash flows of 
bonds that are demanded by investors but are in short supply. It is optimal for intermediaries 
to introduce a safe claim because infinitely risk-averse investors do not value the upside.  
This innovation can also be interpreted as issuing riskless debt against the cash flow of risky 
asset A.  After having issued f new claims, the residual risky return y – fR from A is pledged 
to the shareholders.   
Consider now the market equilibrium. Denote the t=0 price of the new claim by pN.  
The new claim must fetch the same price as a bond (i.e. pN = pB), since the two securities 
have identical cash flows. Financial innovation boosts the supply b of bonds by the amount 








Under A.2, the boost in the supply of riskless claims triggered by financial innovation 
reduces but does not eliminate this shortage, because R y R w r / 1 / + > θ . It is therefore still the 
case that the price of safe claims is equal to investors’ reservation price, namely pN = pB = 
θ·R.  The wealth of investors is sufficiently high to absorb all new claims at that price. Share 
prices are now equal to pA = Ey – yr because the volume of innovation is maximal and so the 
risky asset’s lowest payout is pledged to the holders of the new claim. In the equilibrium 
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1+yr /R 13 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ≡ − × θ θ r
RE y R f .                                           (5) 
The intermediary’s profit rises when yr is higher, since more securities can be issued, and 
when investors’ time preference θ is strong, since the price of the new securities is higher. 
To summarize the analysis thus far, under A.2 the financial markets equilibrium at t = 
0 under rational expectations is described by: 
 
Lemma 2: Under rational expectations, equilibrium at t = 0 with financial innovation is 
characterized by a = 0, b = 1 + yr /R, pA =Ey – yr,  pN = pB = θ·R. 
 
At t = 1, financial innovation does not affect the reaction of markets to the signal s. 
Regardless of the signal, the price of riskless claims does not change and neither do portfolios 
or consumption.  Only pA fluctuates with the expected return on A. In this equilibrium, it does 
not matter whether consumption takes place at t = 0 or t = 1. As we will see, neither of these 
facts remains true with local thinking.  
Finally, consider the welfare consequences of innovation. With innovation, the total 
payoff of investors as of t = 0 stays at UI = w while the intermediary’s payoff becomes Πinn = 
θ·R + (θ – 1)yr + Ey, which is the no-innovation profit Π plus the profits from innovation.  
Social welfare at t = 0 is thus higher with innovation, just as in Allen and Gale (1994). The 
social benefit of financial innovation here consists of relaxing the aggregate shortage of 
riskless bonds. This benefit in our model accrues entirely to the intermediaries because, in the 
market equilibrium, investors purchase riskless claims at their reservation price. 
Our model builds on the idea that a key feature of financial innovation is to allow 
intermediaries to cater to investors’ demand for particular claims, namely riskless bonds. The 
initial excess demand for such bonds gives intermediaries the incentive to manufacture an 
identical riskless security out of a risky cash flow. With infinitely risk-averse investors, the 
model literally describes securitizations expanding the supply of AAA securities.   With 
rational expectations, financial innovation allows gains from trade to be realized, and is 14 
 
strictly beneficial.  Although this effect of financial innovation shows up in the case of local 
thinking as well, in that world it can also lead to excessive innovation and financial fragility.  
 
3. Financial Innovation under Local Thinking 
We consider departures from rational expectations due to agents’ limited ability to 
represent uncertainty. To do so, we follow Gennaioli and Shleifer’s (2010) model of local 
thinking. This model – which provides a unified explanation of several “anomalies” in 
judgments but admits Bayesian rationality as a special case – builds on the notion that agents’ 
inferences are made on the basis of a selected subset of possible events rather than on the 
entire state space. Intuitively, not all states of the world come to mind; the agent does not 
think of everything when imagining the future
3. Crucially, the selection of events from the 
state space is shaped by their true underlying probabilities: more likely events are ceteris 
paribus easier to retrieve from memory than less likely ones. This feature allows one to 
consider how  historical frequencies and news combine to create judgement biases, 
particularly news that change the agent’s representations.       
We model local thinking by assuming that an agent does not think of all three possible 
states i = g, d, r of the risky asset’s payoff but only the two most likely ones. The agent then 
conditions his inferences about the payoff of A on the two states that come to mind, ignoring 
the remaining state. To see how this works, consider a local thinker’s representation of the 
future at t = 0. Since by assumption πg > πd > πr, the states that come to mind are g and d, so 
the agent assesses Pr
L(yg) = Pr(yg| yg, yd) = πg/(πg + πd) and Pr
L(yd) = Pr(yd| yg, yd) = πd/(πg + 
πd), where superscript L stands for “local.”  At t = 0, the local thinker exaggerates the 
probabilities of growth and downturn and neglects the possibility of a recession.  
                                                 
3 Other models of unforeseen contingencies, surveyed by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) are less 
tractable and focus on studying how the awareness of being unaware of some states affects choice, rather then 
on how the set of contingencies that comes to mind is endogenously determined and updated.  15 
 
After s is observed at t = 1, the agent’s assessments are revised.  What comes to mind 
at this point depends on the “true” posterior probabilities πi(s) = Pr(yi|s) for i = g, d, r. Since 
the prior probability of growth is fairly high and we focus on scarcely informative signals 
(formally ρ ≈ 1/2), yg is still the most likely outcome after s is observed. This implies that 
state g is always included in the agent’s representation. Consider now the probability ranking 
of a downturn and a recession.  If the signal is good, ( s s = ), this ranking does not change as 
πd(s) > πr(s). Observing a good signal after a history of economic stability confirms the 
initial representations encoded in assumption A.1. 
A bad signal s = s in contrast is generally informative of lower growth, but especially 






δ ρ ρ ⋅ ≡ > ˆ ,                                                                                     
we have that πr(s) > πd(s), namely a recession becomes more likely than a mere downturn. If 
the prior probabilities πd and πr are not far apart, A.3 is easily met and we henceforth assume 
that it is. This implies that after s = s the representation of uncertainty changes drastically: the 
agent now neglects the possibility of a mere downturn by including state r at the expense of d 
into his representation and thus forms his assessments conditional on yg and yr.  
By formalizing the change in agents’ representations, local thinking allows us to 
identify two general, distinct, effects of bad news.  The first and most fundamental effect is to 
prompt the agent to consider the possibility of a recession. Initially, after a period of 
economic stability, limited representations lead the agent to neglect this unlikely risk. After 
observing a piece of bad news (such as a bank failure), the initially unattended-to possibility 
of a recession comes to the agent’s mind. The second effect of news it that they may induce 
over-reaction. With limited representations, as the possibility of a recession comes to mind, 
other, more favourable, states are crowded out of agents’ attention. This crowding out leads 16 
 
to over-weighting of the probability of recession, which may (but need not) induce a switch 
from the initial optimism to pessimism.
4            
Although over-reaction leads to stronger effects, the main results of our model rely 
merely on the neglect of the possibility of a recession at t = 0. In fact, as we formally show in 
Proposition 2, the “false substitute” effect arises even if the agent’s assessment at t = 1 is 
rational, much as if agents were to learn the true distribution of states after observing s.    
 
3.1 Local Thinking Equilibrium and Innovation at t = 0 
We solve the model by assuming that investors and intermediaries are local thinkers 
and hold the same beliefs. In Section 6 we consider rational expectations intermediaries.   
If the intermediary does not innovate, the equilibrium at t = 0 is very similar to the 
rational expectations case in Lemma 1, except that the share price is now equal to pA = E
Ly = 
E(y| y = yg, yd), which is the value for asset A’s cash flow expected by a local thinker. When 
the intermediary innovates, then given agents’ representations at t = 0, the change from the 
rational expectations case is substantial. When state r is neglected, the number of new riskless 
claims that the intermediary can potentially issue is equal to:  
R y f d
L / = .                                                         (6) 
Since at t = 0 agents do not pay attention to the possibility of a recession, riskless 
claims can be issued until all cash flow yd in a downturn is pledged to investors.  The 
potential volume of financial innovation with local thinking is higher than with rational 
expectations (formally f 
L > f 
RE since yd > yr) because cash flows in a downturn rather than a 
recession can now be pledged to create a “substitute” for a riskless bond.  If investors are 
                                                 
4After observing s a local thinker estimates an average payoff of E(y|yg,yr,s), which is lower than the rational 
agent’s estimate when E(y|yg,yr,s) < yd. If E(y|yg,yr,s) = yd the local and rational thinker’s assessments are 
identical (the local thinker is optimistic otherwise). Thus, the switch from optimism to pessimism arises when 
the recession is very bad, i.e. yr is low. Pessimism may also arise in our model if the probability of growth is 
sufficiently low that after s state yg is disregarded. None of our main results change under these alternative 
specifications. We have chosen the structure of A.1 in order to highlight the fact that the basic mechanism of our 
model does not require pessimism and may arise even if the local thinker’s t = 1assessments are fully rational.      17 
 
sufficiently wealthy, the price of riskless claims stays at pN = pB = θ·R and the extra profit 
from innovation obtained by the intermediary is equal to:   
) 1 ( ) 1 ( − ≡ − × θ θ d
L y R f ,                                              (7) 
which is higher than the profit in Equation (5) under rational expectations. The reason for 
higher profits is the greater volume of innovation. If instead investors’ wealth is not so high, 
innovation can boost the supply of the riskless claim to the point that pB and pN fall below θR, 










Here pB may be so low that an intermediary’s profit from innovation falls below the level in 
Equation (7).
5 If the price drops to pB = pN = R, intermediaries may be willing to supply fewer 
claims than f 
L. A.2 simplifies the analysis by ruling out this case. In fact,  w w >  implies that, 
when f 
L is issued, the equilibrium price pB = pN = wR /(R +yd) is above R.  
 
Proposition 1 Under local thinking, the volume of innovation is R y f d
L / = . We also have at 
t = 0 that b = 1 + f 
L, a = 0, and pA = E(y| yg, yd) –   yd. We have two cases:  1) If  ) ( d y R w w + < < θ , 
then pN =pB = wR /(R +yd) < θR;   2) If  ) ( d y R w + ≥θ , then pN  = pB = θ·R.  
 
                                                 
5 Under rational expectations this case could not occur by virtue of assumption A.2 which implies that investors’ 
wealth is sufficiently large that they can absorb f










When investors’ wealth w is high relative to the supply of riskless claims, demand for 
new claims is high, and so is pB. The reverse is true when investors’ wealth is low relative to 
the amount of riskless claims issued. In this case, the boost in the supply of riskless assets 
triggered by innovation can reduce the price of all safe assets, including the traditional bond, 
below the no-innovation level. In both of the cases of Proposition 1, the intermediary is 
indifferent between consuming the income obtained by selling claims at t = 0 or at t = 1. As 
we will see in section 3.2, the resources carried by the intermediary to t = 1 can affect the 
reaction of markets to news. To highlight this mechanism, we allow the fraction σ  of income 
carried by intermediaries to t = 1 to be anywhere in [ ] 1 , 0 .  
We conclude this analysis of t = 0 by noting that under local thinking the volume of 
new claims issued is likely to be higher (and the price pB lower) than under rational 
expectations. This is so because locally-thinking intermediaries and investors see asset A as 
having a smaller downside risk than do their rational expectations counterparts. This 
encourages the supply of the new claim, which investors see as a riskless bond. The issuance 
“glut” created by local thinking has far-reaching implications for financial fragility. 
 
3.2 Local Thinking Equilibrium and Innovation at t = 1 
We just saw that local thinking boosts the volume of innovation relative to rational 
expectations. This profoundly alters the reaction of markets to the signal s at t = 1. These 
effects do not play out if the signal is good.  In this case, representations do not change and 
the effect of news under local thinking is very similar to that under rational expectations. The 
price for riskless claims is unaffected by news because after observing s the new claim is 
still perceived to be riskless, while share prices rise to pA (s) = E(y| y = yg, yd, s) – yd.  
When the signal is bad, matters are very different because now downside risk is 
represented as a recession with a payoff yr rather than as a downturn with a payoff yd. 19 
 
Investors now realize that the new claims are not riskless! This is so because the volume of 
new securities issued is f 
L= yd /R, so the total repayment promised to investors is equal to yd, 
which exceeds the resources available in a recession. In a recession, intermediaries can repay 





r < ⋅ .                                                            (8) 
The large volume f 
L of new securities issued under local thinking plays a critical role 
here. It is because f 
L is large that in a recession the new securities become risky in the 
aggregate. The arrival of s = s reveals to investors that – contrary to their initial belief – the 
new claim is very different from the safe bond it sought to replicate, and drastically reduces 
their valuation of that claim. This is true even if the news is not very informative and 
investors realize that a recession is still quite unlikely (i.e., πr is small), so that most of the 
times the new claim will in fact repay the promised amount R. The possibility of a recession 
destroys the very idea that made the new claim appealing to investors at t = 0, namely that it 
was just like a riskless bond. The new claims are not true substitutes for the traditional 
claims; they are false substitutes, severely affecting financial markets at t = 1.
6 
To see this, note that after seeing s investors’ reservation price for the traditional bond 
is equal to θ·R while that for the new claim drops to θ(yr/yd)·R, the present value of the latter 
claim’s payout in a recession. In contrast, the intermediary’s reservation price for traditional 
bonds is equal to R and that for the new claim is equal to: 





L L + ≡ ⋅ ω ω .                         (9) 
Risk neutral intermediaries value the new claim at their perceived expected repayment. Here 
1 <
L ω  reflects the drop in the new claim’s expected payout. Our analysis is general but our 
                                                 
6 The new claim pays less than the traditional bond in yr no matter what the t = 1 signal is, but investors 
recognize this at t = 1 if and only if the signal is s, which is why markets are fragile only in that state.  20 
 
results are best appreciated in the case where s is barely informative about repayment even 
for a local thinker, namely  1 ≈
L ω  (once again, this requires πr to be small).     
These reservation prices lead to two important observations. First, after seeing s 
investors value the new claim less than the bond, creating a force toward the segmentation of 
the previously unified market for safe claims. Second, investors’ reservation price for the new 
claim may fall below intermediaries’ reservation price [this occurs when θ(yr/yd) < ω
L]. In 
this case, investors wish to sell the new claims back to intermediaries, who – depending on 
their wealth σ – may or may not have the money to buy them. 
To see how prices are set at t = 1, we focus on the case where the price of safe claims 
at t = 0 is below θ·R [case 1) of Proposition 1] and where investors’ valuation of the new 
claim at t = 1 falls below intermediaries’ valuation [i.e. θ(yr/yd) < ω
L]. This  captures a 
scenario where innovation: a) is so extensive as to affect the bond market at t = 0 and b) 
induces a misallocation of the new claim at t = 1. The latter condition is crucial for it is 
precisely when innovation transfers neglected risks to the least efficient risk bearer (the 
investor) that a “false substitute” effect arises.  Proposition 2 deals with the other cases also.    
One immediate consequence of our previous discussion is that after observing s the 
price of traditional bonds rises from its initial level pB = wR /(R +yd) < θ·R to investors’ 
reservation level, namely pB1 = θ·R.  This rise is connected to the drop in investors’ valuation 
of the new securities. After realizing that the new claim is risky, investors try to sell it in the 
market to increase current consumption and to purchase the truly riskless bonds. This boost in 
the demand for bonds encounters a limited supply, which causes bond prices to rise. At the 
same time, the price of the new claim must drop, for the maximal valuation ω
LR of that claim 
in the market is lower than its t = 0 price. As a consequence, once investors realize that the 
new securities are false substitutes for the old ones, there is a “flight to safety” causing bond 
prices to rise and the price of the new claim to fall. 21 
 
The extent of the new claim’s price drop crucially depends on the wealth of the 
intermediaries. Suppose that the intermediaries carry little or no wealth to t = 1, so that they 
do not have the resources to buy all of the new claims, even when the latter are priced at 










In equilibrium, the new claim’s price drops to investors’ valuation θ·(yr/yd)·R even though 
intermediaries are willing to buy it at a higher price. The problem is that intermediaries have 
little wealth and thus can absorb only some new claims. This low demand by intermediaries 
(the downward sloping curve in the bottom part of Figure 5) leads to a major price drop.   
Intuitively, as the wealth σ of intermediaries increases, their demand also rises, 
potentially driving the equilibrium price of the new claim above θ·(yr/yd)·R.  In the extreme 
case of σ = 1, intermediaries carry all of their t = 0 income to t = 1 and thus have enough 
funds to buy all of the new claims at the initial equilibrium price pB (after all, they obtained 
these resources by selling the new claims at t = 0). But then, since  R p
L
B ⋅ >ω , 
intermediaries can afford to buy all of the new claims at their reservation price  R
L ⋅ ω . When 
σ = 1 the equilibrium price must thus settle at pN1 =  R
L ⋅ ω  to make intermediaries willing to 
absorb precisely the amount of new claims held by investors in the market. 
pB1 = θ·R 
b  1 
market for new claims at t = 1 
bond market at t = 1 
pB = wR/(R+yd) 
ω
L·R 
pN1 = θ·(yr/yd) · ·R 
market for riskless 
claims at t = 0 
1 + f 
L  F 
L22 
 
This discussion allows us to decompose the drop in the new claim’s price into two 
components. The first consists of the difference between the initial price pB = wR /(R +yd) and 
intermediaries’ reservation price  R
L ⋅ ω . This price drop, which is caused by the fact that the 
over-issuance of new claims renders the latter risky, is needed to restore the allocation of 
risky payoffs yi that prevails without innovation (which is more efficient than the one attained 
with innovation). The second component is the drop from  R
L ⋅ ω  to θ·(yr/yd)·R, which 
captures what we call the “false substitutes” effect.  Even if the new claim is only mildly 
risky, it is not what investors wanted (given their infinite risk aversion). Thus, they dump it in 
the market even though intermediaries cannot absorb it in large volumes given their limited 
wealth. Here over-issuance exacerbates fragility by boosting the supply of new claims by 
disgruntled investors (shifting out the upward sloping supply in the bottom part of Figure 5).  
These broad patterns of market segmentation and financial fragility, as well as the role 
of intermediaries’ wealth, extend to other parameter constellations.  
 
Proposition 2 After news s, the traditional bond trades at pB1 = θ·R, the price of the new 
claim drops to  pN1 < pN.  If  ) / ( d r
L y y ⋅ ≤θ ω  then pN1 = θ·(yr/yd)·R and new claims are not 
traded. If  ) / ( d r
L y y ⋅ >θ ω  then pN1 = 1() N p σ [ ] R R y y
L
d r ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∈ ω θ , ) / (  , where  1() N p σ  is a 
function that increases in σ ,  R y y p d r ) / ( ) 0 ( θ =  and  R p
L ⋅ =ω ) 1 ( . Now there is at least 
some re-trading of new claims provided σ > 0. 
 
It is thus a general feature of the model that the bond price at t=1 is equal to its 
maximum possible value θ·R.  Bond prices rise only if the initial equilibrium price pB was 
below θ·R [i.e., in case 1) of Proposition 1].  The price of the new claim always falls below its 
t = 0 level. If θ(yr/yd) ≥ ω
L the price drops to investors’ reservation level and no re-trading 
occurs. In this case, the intermediaries’ wealth does not matter because they are the low 23 
 
valuation market participants. If instead θ(yr/yd) <  ω
L, then intermediaries wish to buy back 
some new claims, thus helping support their price.  They buy more the higher is their wealth 
σ.  Given the key role of intermediaries’ wealth in shaping price fluctuations, in sections 4 
and 6 we pin down σ by introducing production and rational intermediaries, respectively.  
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that we have implicitly assumed that 
there is no innovation at t=1 after s is observed.  In practice, investors (rather than 
intermediaries) may repackage new claims, keeping the safe portion (yr/yd)R for themselves 
and selling off to the risky portion to intermediaries. This re-tranching might improve risk 
allocation in the economy but it would only marginally attenuate financial fragility when 
intermediaries’ wealth is low. Indeed, low-wealth intermediaries would be able to pay very 
little for the risky portion of new claims, keeping their price low.
7 
 
3.3 Innovation, Local Thinking and Financial Fragility: Discussion 
  Our model places the demand for new claims at the heart of the link between financial 
innovation and fragility. Investors’ initial excess demand for safe claims encourages 
intermediaries to manufacture new claims out of risky cash flows that are perceived to be 
equally safe. As investors realize that the new claims are a false substitute for the old ones, 
their reluctance to hold on to these claims triggers a sharp price drop even after marginally 
bad news. These marked shifts in the demand for the new safe claims are intimately 
connected to financial innovation.  
                                                 
7 One could consider innovations that, rather than replicating the bond’s cash flow, supply Arrow-Debreu 
securities. If intermediaries supply two such securities, one paying 1 dollar if the state is yg, the other if the state 
is not yg (i.e. if the economy slows-down), investors could replicate the safe asset by purchasing an equal 
amount of them. This form of innovation also leads to over-issuance: all of the cash flow yd available in a 
downturn is sold under the security paying out in the slowdown as local thinking investors and intermediaries 
identify such slowdown with cash flow yd, not yr. As the economy’s slowdown is revised downward to yr, 
however, this security cannot be repaid in full and its price drops. The only difference with our current setup is 
that Arrow-Debreu claims automatically allow investors to implement the outcome attained under retranching 
by selling the securities that pay out in yg until the investor’s portfolio pays the same in all future states. 24 
 
The pressure to create new safe claims is strong precisely when investors disregard 
specific risks such as a possible collapse of home prices in light of favourable recent history. 
This optimism boosts intermediaries’ ability to sell new claims and thus their incentive to 
innovate. The issuance glut renders the new claim vulnerable to the arrival of bad news that 
bring to mind previously neglected risks and thus the critical fact that the new claims are not 
as safe as the assets they sought to replicate. Because of their preferred habitats, investors try 
to rebalance their portfolios in favour of the truly safe traditional claims, triggering massive 
sales of the new claims and price drops.  Such sales are not driven by leverage or liquidation 
demands, as in standard fire sales models, but by the fall in demand that arises as investors 
realize that these new securities are false substitutes for the old ones.    
The general message of our model is that when investors neglect certain risks, 
financial innovation creates a false substitutability between the new and traditional claims. 
This false substitutability explains both the excessive volume of innovation ex-ante and the 
ex-post flight to quality occurring as investors come to realize that the new claim exposes 
them to previously unattended to risks.  Although the motives for financial innovation are the 
same in our model as in Allen and Gale (1994), the consequences are very different. In our 
model, innovation benefits intermediaries who earn large profits selling securities at t = 0, but 
hurts investors, who are lured into an inefficient risk allocation and suffer from ex-post price 
drops.  Investors’ losses depend on the liquidity of intermediaries and their ability to provide 
backstop insurance against price drops at t =1.  As we show in Section 5, in an economy with 
production both investors and intermediaries might lose from innovation.   
 
4. Innovation and Local Thinking in a Production Economy 
Suppose that instead of the intermediaries owning assets, they have exclusive access 
to production technologies (or activities) B and A. Activity B yields R at t = 2 for any unit 25 
 
invested at t = 0. The return of activity A is stochastic, equal to yi with probability πi, where as 
before i = g, d, r. The riskless activity is in limited supply, so investment IB in activity B 
cannot exceed 1. Investment IA in activity A is in principle unbounded.  
The intermediary has initial wealth wint < 1 but can raise additional funds from 
investors by selling claims on A and B. The traditional claim to finance B is a riskless bond 
priced at pB at t = 0 and yields R at t = 2; the traditional claim to finance A has a unit cost pA 
and yields yi at t =2. The difference from the pure exchange economy of Sections 2 and 3 is 
that now the supply of claims must be consistent with the intermediary’s optimal investment 
decisions. For brevity, we study this production economy only under local thinking, but we 
later discuss the role of limited representations. In the absence of innovation, the intermediary 
chooses investment levels IB and IA, and issues volumes b and a of traditional claims to solve:   
AB ,, I, I, , max
AB ba i i Π≡  R(IB-b) + E
Ly(IA – a) – IB – IA + bpB + apA + wint             (10) 
                            s.t.       IB = bpB + iB,                                                                     (11)  
  IA = apA + iA,                                                                     (12)    
  iB + iA ≤ wint ,                                                                     (13) 
  b ≤ IB ≤ 1,  a ≤ IA.                                                              (14) 
In Equation (10), the intermediary’s payoff is equal to the output generated by A and B net of 
investors’ repayment, minus investment costs, plus the revenue from security sales at t = 0.  
Constraints (11) and (12) say that investment in A or B is equal to the intermediary’s own 
investment in the activity (iA, iB) plus the funds raised from investors. Constraint (13) says 
that the intermediary’s own investments cannot exceed his wealth wint; the constraints in (14) 
limit total investment and the supply of claims. 
By substituting Equations (11) and (12) into the objective function (10) and in the 
constraints in (14) we can rewrite the intermediary’s problem as: 
≡ Π
B A i i a b , , , max   R[(pB – 1)b+ iB] + E
Ly[(pA – 1)a+ iA] – iA –  iB + wint              (15) 26 
 
                 s.t.             iB + iA ≤ wint,                                                                         (16) 
– (pB – 1)b ≤ iB ≤ 1 – pB b,   – (pA – 1)a ≤ iA .                         (17) 
The objective function (15) shows that the intermediary is willing to issue a claim only if its 
price is higher than 1. In this case, the revenue generated by each unit of security issued is 
higher than the investment cost of creating the promised return. We assume: 
 
A.4:  θ·yd < 1 and w >  [] ) 1 /( ) 1 ( int
*
d d y w y R w ⋅ − − + ⋅ = θ θ      
 
The first part of A.4 says that investors’ reservation price for the risky claim is less than one, 
which implies that in equilibrium pA < 1 and thus the risky claim is not issued (a = 0).  The 
second part of A.4 says that the investors’ wealth is sufficiently high that, even with 
innovation, the price of riskless claims is pB = θ·R. This restriction, which is stronger than the 
one in A.2, simplifies the equilibrium analysis but can be relaxed.  Under A.4 it is immediate 
to see that the equilibrium at t = 0 works as follows: 
 
Lemma 3 In the absence of innovation, no risky claim is issued (a = 0) and  pA ≤ 1. The bond 
is issued for an amount b = 1 and pB = θ·R. The intermediary withdraws profits from the sale 
of b from activity B by setting iB = – (θ·R – 1). If  E
Ly ≥ 1 the intermediary invests these 
resources in A by setting iA = wint + θ·R – 1, so pA = 1. If  E
Ly < 1 the intermediary sets iA = 0, 
consumes wint + θ·R – 1 before t = 2, and E
Ly ≤ pA < 1. 
 
The main features of the pure exchange equilibrium of Lemma 1 also obtain in the 
production economy. There is a shortage of riskless bonds, and their entire supply is sold to 
investors at their reservation price. No risky claims are issued. The only difference from the 
pure exchange economy is that now the risky activity is only operated if its expected return is 
higher than the cost of investment (i.e., E
Ly ≥ 1). 
  
4.1 Innovation, Equilibrium and Reaction to News  27 
 
As in Section 3, the intermediary creates new riskless claims by pledging the lowest 
possible output level generated by A. The maximum quantity of new claims that can be 
created in this way is equal to: 
f 
LP = yd · IA/R.                                                           (18) 
The ability to create new claims increases in the amount of investment in activity A. Taking 
this effect into account, with innovation the intermediary solves:   
≡ Π
B A i i f b , , ,max  R[(pB – 1)b+ iB] + (pBE
Ly – R)·f + E
Ly iA + wint – iB – iA      (19) 
                            s.t.        iB + iA ≤ wint ,                                                                  (20) 
     f ≤ f 
LP= iA [yd / (R – pB yd)],                                             (21) 
 – (pB – 1)b ≤ iB ≤ 1 – pB b,   0 ≤ iA.                                    (22)            
Constraint (21) directly follows from substituting into (18) the definition of investment IA = 
fpB + iA, where we have once more imposed pB = pN. One important implication of (21) is that 
new claims can only be issued if the intermediary invests some of his wealth in A by setting 
iA > 0. This is due to assumption A.4, which implies that yd is sufficiently small that the 
intermediary must insure investors against the bad state by committing some of its wealth to 
the project. We also assume: 
 
A.5  θ·E
Ly > 1. 
 
A.5 implies that, in order to maximize objective (19) at pB = θ·R, the intermediary always 
wants to issue the maximum possible volume of new bonds f 
LP because the price the 
intermediary obtains for these bonds is higher than the ratio between the promised return R 
and A’s average return E
Ly.  We then have: 
 
Proposition 3 Under A.4 and A.5, there are two possible equilibrium configurations: 
1) If E
Ly + (θ – 1) ·yd < 1, innovation does not occur and the equilibrium described in 
Lemma 3 arises. 28 
 
2) If E
Ly + (θ – 1) ·yd > 1, innovation occurs. The price of riskless claims is pB = θ·R, 
the intermediary sets IB = b = 1 and iB = – (θ·R – 1). This allows the intermediary to set iA = 
wint + θ·R – 1, and to sell the new security in volume f 
LP = [wint + θ·R – 1] [yd / R (1 – θ·yd)]. 
 
Compared to Proposition 1, here a cost of financial innovation arises endogenously 
when the physical return to capital in A is lower than the investment cost, i.e. E
Ly <1. In this 
case, creating new securities requires the intermediary to invest in the risky technology, 
which entails a private cost. If however the unit profit (θ – 1) ·yd obtained by the intermediary 
from each new “riskless” claim is large enough to more than compensate for the cost 
[formally if E
Ly + (θ – 1) ·yd > 1], then innovation takes place. As we shall see, through this 
effect financial innovation can be a source of investment inefficiencies because at t = 0 the 
intermediary may decide to invest in A and sell new claims even when he would not invest 
absent the possibility of financial innovation. 
  The second message of Proposition 3 is that when the creation of new claims requires 
investment, an intermediary’s desire to create new claims introduces a strong force for it to 
commit all of his initial wealth and income to investment so as to expand the volume of 
innovation. As a consequence, when at t = 1 bad news arrives, the intermediary does not have 
spare wealth to buy any of the new claims back.  The result below formally shows the 
consequences of this logic: 
 
Proposition 4 In the equilibrium with innovation of Proposition 3, after the arrival of a bad 
signal s = s at t =1, the price of the traditional bond stays constant at pB1 = θ·R, while the price 
of the new claim drops to pN1 = θ·(yr/yd)·R  and new claims are not traded at t = 1. 
 
The key difference from the result obtained in the pure exchange economy is that now 
the equilibrium price of the new claim drops to investors’ valuation regardless of whether the 
intermediary’s reservation price  R
L ⋅ ω  for the same claim is higher than θ·(yr/yd)·R.  29 
 
Intermediaries have no spare wealth to buy back the new claims at t = 1 because they have 
optimally invested the totality of their t = 0 resources to boost the volume of innovation.  As a 
consequence, the local thinker’s neglect of the possibility of a recession leads to substantial 
price drops even when intermediaries barely react to news.  The idea that intermediaries tie 
up their capital in innovation, and have no spare liquidity in a crisis, is also present in Shleifer 
and Vishny (2010).  In that model, intermediaries had to co-invest with outsiders to keep 
some “skin in the game.” Here the mechanism is different: profit maximizing intermediaries 
need to commit their capital at t = 0 to provide insurance to investors, but doing so deprives 
them of liquidity in a crisis.   
This analysis reinforces the message of the exchange model with respect to the role 
played by the shifting demand for new securities in generating financial fragility. The 
issuance “glut” fostered by investors’ demand for riskless claims creates the room for severe 
price drops not only by inducing investors to recognize the claim as risky upon the arrival of 
bad news, but also by reducing the liquidity of intermediaries and thus their ability to support 
the new claim’s price. The initial boost in the issuance of the new securities, and their ex-post 
price decline, are just two sides of the same coin.   
 
5. Welfare Analysis  
Section 2 showed that under rational expectations financial innovation is socially 
beneficial: it boosts intermediaries’ profits while leaving investors’ welfare unchanged.
8 With 
local thinking, the welfare analysis is more complex. From the viewpoint of agents’ beliefs at 
t = 0, financial innovation is beneficial, just as under rational expectations. However, since 
agents’ initial beliefs are incorrect, this welfare level is illusory because it does not account 
for the riskiness of new claims. Behavioural economists have long stressed that this tension 
                                                 
8 In the model of Section 2 intermediaries obtain the full benefit of innovation because assumption A.2 ensures 
that investors buy the new claim at their reservation price. If A.2 does not hold, the price of the new claim drops 
below θ·R, investors also benefit from innovation, and the creation of the new claim makes everybody better off. 30 
 
between reality and incorrect beliefs raises important conceptual issues for defining a 
normative welfare metric. We do not aim to resolve these issues in this section.  
Instead we consider how the “false substitute” effect created by financial innovation 
affects the average payoff realized by market participants, computed using the true 
distribution of states (and signals) as of t=0. For brevity, we focus on the most interesting 
case where  ) / ( d r
L y y ⋅ >θ ω . We also assume that in the exchange economy the new claim 
receives its maximal price pB  =  θ·R at t = 0, which facilitates the comparison between 
exchange and production, as in the latter case it is also true that pB = θ·R. 
 
5.1 Welfare in the Pure Exchange Model   
Without financial innovation, the average welfare of investors as of t = 0 is trivially 
equal to E(U) =  w, while that of intermediaries to E(Π) = θ·R + E(y), where U and Π denote 
the utility of the investor and intermediary, respectively. To gauge the effect of financial 
innovation, suppose for a moment that there is no trading at t = 1. Then the expected welfare 
of investors as of t = 0 is equal to E(Uinn) = w – θ·(yd – yr), that of intermediaries is equal to 
E(Πinn) = θ·R (1 + f 
L) + E(y) – (πg+ πd)yd – πryr. Relative to the no innovation case, investors 
lose because they bear the risk of a recession and intermediaries gain because they sell more 
overpriced safe claims at t= 0. Of course, the possibility of trading at t = 1 allows investors to 
undo at least in part their original portfolio and thus to reduce their losses under innovation.  
 
Lemma 4 With financial innovation, if σ = 0 investors lose θ·(yd – yr) and intermediaries gain 
θ·yd – (πg+ πd)yd – πryr relative to the no innovation case.  If instead σ = 1, investors lose 
Pr(s )θ·(yd – yr) + Pr(s)(θ – ω
L)yd and intermediaries gain Pr(s ){θ·yd –[πg(s )+πd(s )]yd – 
πr(s )yr}+ Pr(s)(θ – ω
L)yd  relative to the no innovation case. 
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Innovation benefits the intermediary by allowing it to sell more claims while it hurts 
investors by enabling them to buy a claim that is more risky than they think.  If intermediaries 
do not carry wealth to t = 1 then – given that  ) / ( d r
L y y ⋅ >θ ω  – the loss to investors is larger 
than intermediaries’ gain because investors inefficiently bear risk in equilibrium.
9 If in 
contrast intermediaries carry wealth to t = 1 there is a net loss from innovation after s  but 
there is no “net loss” after s: by buying back the new claims, intermediaries allow investors 
to increase current consumption, preventing them from bearing any future risk.  
  This analysis illustrates that, besides creating market fragility, false substitutability 
adds a countervailing cost to the standard “market completing” benefit of financial 
innovation. Here the cost of innovation always dominates its benefits due to investors’ 
infinite risk aversion, but with more moderate preferences the net effect would be ambiguous. 
 
5.2 Welfare in the Model with Production   
One key change in the production model is that because the intermediary does not 
carry any wealth to t=1, there is no trading at t=1.  With innovation, the welfare of investors 
as of t = 0 is equal to E(Uinn) = w – θ·R· f 
LP [1 – (yr/yd)], where f 
LP= [wint + θ·R – 1] [yd / R (1 
– θ·yd)] is the volume of innovation occurring with production. Since the intermediary invests 
all of its wealth in A, it carries no wealth to t = 1. As a consequence, in the spirit of Lemma 4, 
investors lose f 
LPθ·R [1 – (yr/yd)] from innovation.  
Consider now the intermediary’s welfare in the production model.  Now innovation 
and local thinking may induce the intermediary to undertake unprofitable investments.  
  
Proposition 5 When E
Ly +(θ–1)yd >1, the intermediary innovates and two cases arise: 
1)  If E
Ly < 1, the intermediary gains in the case of innovation if and only if: 
                                                 
9This follows from the fact that (πg+ πd)yd + πryr > θ·yr if and only if (πg+ πd) + πr( yr/yd) > θ·( yr/yd), which 
always holds if 
L ω > θ·( yr/yd) because (πg+ πd) + πr( yr/yd) > [πg(s)+πd(s)] + πr(s)( yr/yd) > 
L ω > θ·( yr/yd).    32 
 
E(y) + {θ – [(πg+πd) + πr(yr/yd)]} ·yd  > 1.                             (23) 
2)  If E
Ly ≥ 1, the intermediary gains in the case of innovation if and only if: 
θ E(y) >  [(πg+πd) + πr(yr/yd)].                                      (24) 
 
In the model with production, not only investors, but also intermediaries might lose 
from financial innovation.  As Equations (23) and (24) illustrate, intermediaries may lose 
from innovation when the true expected return from activity A is sufficiently low that 
manufacturing new claims is not profitable to begin with (not even by taking into account the 
fact that these claims do not repay in full in a recession).  Formally, this means that E(y) must 
be sufficiently lower than 1. In this case, optimism about the profitability of the new claim at 
t = 0 encourages the intermediary to over-invest in an unproductive activity, eventually 
triggering a loss.  The most interesting case in this respect occurs when E
Ly < 1. Now the 
return to A is perceived to be sufficiently low that investment in A occurs only if new 
securities can be engineered, so financial innovation bears sole responsibility for 
unproductive investment.   The expansion in the supply of housing in the decade prior to 
2007 might have been an example of such inefficient investment needed to meet the growing 
demand for securitization of mortgages (Mian and Sufi 2009, Keys et al. 2010).  
In sum, while under rational expectations financial innovation improves social 
welfare by reducing the shortage of riskless claims, under local thinking it can reduce both 
investors’ and even intermediaries’ welfare by distorting the allocation of risk and investment 
in the economy. 
 
6. Rational Intermediaries 
We have assumed so far that intermediaries and investors share the same incorrect 
beliefs. We now show that the “false substitutes” effect holds even if the intermediaries hold 
rational expectations. Rationality of the intermediaries introduces two changes into our 33 
 
previous setting. First, the intermediaries evaluate returns correctly, which influences their 
investment and issuance decisions. Second, intermediaries may try to profit from the possible 
drop in prices of the new securities by carrying some liquid wealth to t = 1. This second 
effect (emphasized by Diamond and Rajan 2010) may offset an intermediary’s incentive to 
commit its wealth to the risky project so as to expand the supply of new claims. 
When deciding at t = 0 what volume f of new securities to issue, what amount of own 
wealth iA to invest in A, and what amount of own wealth l to leave liquid for t = 1, a forward 
looking intermediary solves: 
 
,, , max
AB bai i Π≡ R[(pB – 1)b+ iB] + [pBEy – (1 – πr)R – πr(yr/yd)R]·f + Ey iA + 
+ wint – iB – iA + l·Pr(s)( 1 N
rational p R − ⋅ ω )/ 1 N p                 (25) 
 
            s.t.                   iB + iA + l ≤ wint ,                                                              (26) 
     f ≤ iA [yd / (R – pB yd)],                                                     (27) 
 – (pB – 1)b ≤ iB ≤ 1 – pB b,   0 ≤ iA , 0 ≤ l                         (28)   
 
In the above program, 
rational ω  denotes the new claim’s repayment expected by the 
rational intermediary [formally,  ) / )( Pr( ) Pr( d r r d
rational y y s y s y y + ≥ ≡ ω ], which is always 
higher than the repayment expected by a local thinker [i.e. 
rational ω >
L ω  for all  0 > r π ].  The 
rational intermediary anticipates, in the second term of the objective function in (25), the 
possibility that in a recession the new claim pays only (yr/yd)R. Additionally, the last term in 
Equation (25) illustrates that the intermediary expects to obtain a capital gain of 
( 1 N
rational p R − ⋅ ω )/ 1 N p  by leaving some liquid wealth l for the event that the signal turns out 
to be low, which occurs with ex ante probability Pr(s).
10 
                                                 
10 One implicit restriction in the above problem is that the intermediary cannot issue deposits to investors to 
finance its liquidity at t = 1. This restriction is weak as these deposits must pay a return of 1 to the local thinking 34 
 
As in Section 4, under A.5 the intermediary issues – for a given amount of capital iA 
committed to A – the maximum possible amount of new claims at t = 0, implying that 
constraint (27) is binding.  Since the equilibrium price of riskless claims at t = 0 is still equal 
to pB = θ·R, the intermediary invests up to capacity in B and sets iB = – (θ·R – 1). The new 
choice that the rational intermediary must make is whether to invest his wealth wint + θ·R – 1 
into A so as to expand the supply of new claims at t = 0 or to store liquidity until t = 1 by 
setting  l > 0.  From objective (25) and constraint (27), it is easy to check that at the 
equilibrium price pB = θ·R the return the intermediary obtains from increasing iA is higher 
than that from increasing l, so that it is optimal for the intermediary to set l = 0, provided:    
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.                             (30) 
Even a rational intermediary invests all of its wealth in A when each unit invested in 
the risky project generates a sufficiently large upside (which the intermediary keeps for 
himself). The return from investing $1 in A is multiplied by the factor  ) 1 /( 1 d y θ − , which 
captures the intermediary’s ability to profit by creating new claims from such investment, 
realize a profit on them, to reinvest that profit in A to create more new claims and so on. 
Condition (30) is hardest to satisfy when the probability that the new claim defaults is 
negligible (in the extreme when  1 =
rational ω ) and the price of the new claim at t = 1 is the 
lowest, namely when pN1 = θ·(yr/yd)·R.  In this case, the rational intermediary invests all of its 
wealth in A at t = 0 provided:   
                                                                                                                                                        
investor who is therefore indifferent between lending or not. Furthermore, under a broad set of conditions the 



























,                                   (31) 
which is satisfied for a broad range of parameter values.  If Condition (31) does not hold, 
then the intermediary restricts the supply of new claims up to the point where the capital gain 
on the new claims is sufficiently small to use some but not all of his wealth to innovate, and 
to transfer the rest to t = 1.  
 
7. Discussion 
  Our paper offers a different perspective on the recent financial crisis and policy 
reforms that have emerged among economists.  Several economists, including Gorton and 
Metrick (2010) and Stein (2010) recognize the creation of safe securities as an important 
function of the banking and shadow banking systems.  In their view, the creation of such 
“private money” is in itself desirable, but exposes the financial system to the risks of financial 
meltdown due to socially excessive leverage.  Desirable policies would thus seek to preserve 
the creation of liquidity by the banking system, but control leverage or improve mechanisms 
of reducing leverage and unwinding security holdings in distress.   
  Our model, in contrast, questions the idea that all creation of private money by the 
banking system is necessarily desirable.  We recognize the benefits of private supply of safe 
securities, but also note that, at least in some cases, such securities proved to be false 
substitutes for the traditional ones. False substitutes by themselves lead to financial 
instability, and may reduce welfare, even without the effects of excessive leverage.   
The financial fragility discussed in our model would interact, perhaps dangerously, 
with leverage.  When investors or intermediaries perceive some securities to be safe, they 
would borrow using them as collateral, often with very low haircuts (Shleifer and Vishny 
2010, Stein 2010).  The realization that these securities are actually risky would lead to their 36 
 
sales by both investors and intermediaries trying to meet their collateral requirements, leading 
to additional fragility from fire sales.  The stronger is the ex ante belief that securities are 
safe, the higher is the borrowing against them, and the more extreme the fire sales.   Sales 
from unwinding levered positions and sales from disappointed expectations thus go in the 
same direction.  As discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (2010) and Stein (2010), depressed 
security prices can have especially adverse welfare consequences ex post because they cut off 
lending to new investment.   A financial crisis leads to an economic crisis.  We do not discuss 
these welfare issues here because they have been analyzed elsewhere, but only emphasize the 
reinforcing influence of leverage and misunderstood risks on fragility.      
If this perspective is correct, it suggests that recent policy proposals, while desirable 
in terms of their intent to control leverage and fire sales, do not go far enough.  It is not just 
the leverage, but the scale of financial innovation and of creation of new claims itself, that 
might require regulatory attention.  This might be a particularly significant issue when the 
safety of particular products or securities is illusory.  
  For example, the innovation of money market funds has arguably created much 
instability by giving millions of investors the expectation of getting their money back on 
demand at par, even though it is invested in securities that are far from riskless.  Our model 
suggests that it might be better to help investors form more realistic expectations by 
mandating that these funds be marked to market.  With more realistic expectations of net 
asset value fluctuations, “breaking the buck” would no longer be a dramatic event that sparks 
a run on these funds and creates financial fragility.    
 
8. Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is straightforward but illustrates the basic logic behind several 
of our results. Given that Ey > θ·yd, there exists no price pA ≥ Ey at which intermediaries are 
willing to sell that also induces investors to buy. As a result, pA = Ey and each intermediary is 37 
 
happy to hold its endowment of shares, i.e. a = 0. If pB < θ·R, investors demand more than 1 
unit of bonds [because by A2 w/θR >1] and – provided pB ≥ R – intermediaries are willing to 
sell the full supply b =1.  As a result, in equilibrium it must be that pB = θ·R so that is optimal 
for investors to buy exactly b = 1.   
 
Proof of Lemma 2. The result directly follows from the proof of lemma 1, with only two 
changes. First, the supply of bonds is now equal to b = 1 + yr/R, but A2 implies that investors 
can absorb all of it at their reservation price, so in equilibrium pB = θ·R. Second, pA = Ey-yd 
and none of the risky claims are sold to investors (who value them zero). 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. The result directly follows from the proof of lemma 1, with the only 
changes of replacing yr with yd. Then, since the supply of bonds is now b = 1 + yd/R, if 
investors can absorb it at their reservation price, namely if w/(θ·R) ≥ 1 + yd/R, in equilibrium 
pB = θ·R. If instead this is not the case, i.e. if w < θ·(R + yd), then investors spend all of their 
wealth to purchase the bonds and pB = wR/(R+yd) > R. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the market’s reaction to a bad signal s. In the first place, 
note that the t = 1 equilibrium must have pB1 = θ·R. To see why, suppose that pB1 < θ·R (as we 
have seen, pB1 > θ·R is not an equilibrium because at this price investors sell their bonds but 
intermediaries are not willing to buy them). At this price, investors want to purchase as many 
bonds as possible provided pN1 > (yr /yd) pB1 for in this case the price-return ratio is lower for 
bonds than for the new claim. This cannot of course be an equilibrium because investors’ 
demand for bonds does not encounter any supply. Consider instead the case where pN1 ≤ (yr 
/yd) pB1. Now the new claim is priced below investors’ valuation pN1 < (yr /yd)θ·R. This cannot 
however be an equilibrium because all investors demand the new claim (or some of the bond 
as well) but nobody supplies it.  As a result, it must be that pB1 = θ·R. 
Consider now the market for the new claim. Given that pB1 = θ·R, if pN1 < (yr /yd)θ·R 
all investors would demand the new claim at t = 1, which cannot be an equilibrium because 
investors hold the total supply of it. As a result, in equilibrium it must be that pN1 ≥ (yr 
/yd)θ·R. If pN1 = (yr /yd)θ·R investors are indifferent between holding and selling the claim, if 
pN1 > (yr /yd)θ·R investors supply their total holdings f 
L. If ω
L < (yr /yd)θ, the intermediary’s 
valuation of the new claim is lower than investors’ valuation. As a result, the equilibrium 
price is equal to pN1 = (yr /yd)θ·R. If instead ω
L > (yr /yd)θ, intermediaries are willing to buy at 38 
 
least some of the claims from investors and the equilibrium price pN1 depends on the share σ 
of t = 0 income carried by the intermediary to t = 1. 
The intermediary’s t = 0 income can take two values depending on whether the t=0 
equilibrium falls in case 1) or 2) of proposition 1.  If we are in case 1), namely θ·(R+yr) < w < 
θ·(R+yd), the intermediary’s t = 0 income is equal to w. As a result, the intermediary’s wealth 
at t = 1 is equal to σ·w. By equalizing supply and demand for the new claim one can easily 
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Which implies, together with A2 that  1() NB p p σ <  = wR/(R+yd).   
Suppose instead that we are in case 2), namely w > θ·(R+yd), the intermediary’s t = 0 
income is equal to θ(R+yd). In this case, the intermediary’s wealth at t = 1 is equal to 
σ·θ(R+yd). By equalizing supply and demand for the new claim one can easily find that the 
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It is obvious that  1() NB p p σ <  = θR.   
 
Proof of Lemma 3. For investors to buy shares it must be that pA ≤ θ·yd. By A4 this implies 
that investors only buy shares if pA < 1. However, in objective (15) the intermediary issues 
shares only if pA ≥ 1. As a result, in equilibrium the intermediary does not issue any shares 
and pA ≤ 1. Since in equilibrium pB =θR ≥ R, the intermediary issues the maximal amount b = 
1 bonds because these yield at least as much as the intermediary’s own investment iB in B at 
the same unit investment cost. Thus, the intermediary withdraws from B the profits from 
bond sales by setting  iB =  – (θR – 1). The intermediary then invests these resources along 
with his wealth wint in A if and only if E
Ly ≥ 1. When E
Ly ≥ 1 the equilibrium price of shares 
is pA = 1 (if pA < 1 intermediaries would prefer to buy shares than to invest). When E
Ly < 1 39 
 
the equilibrium price of shares is E
Ly < pA < 1 (so that no investment occurs, no shares are 
issued, and no shares are demanded).   
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume for now that pB =θR, we later show that in equilibrium it 
must be so. This has two consequences.  First, under A5 it follows from objective (19) that 
the intermediary issues the maximum volume of new claims so that (21) is binding. Second, 
as in the proof of Lemma 3, the intermediary issues b = 1 bonds and sets iB =  – (θR – 1). By 
substituting pB =θR and constraint (21) into the intermediary’s objective (19), we see that up 
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As a result, when E
Ly + (θ – 1)yd < 1 the intermediary sets iA = 0 and does not create any new 
claims. When instead E
Ly + (θ – 1)yd ≥ 1 the intermediary sets iA at its maximum wint+ (θR – 
1) and issues new claims for the volume implied by Equation (21). It is easy to check that 
given A4 this volume is sufficiently low (relative to investors’ wealth w) that the equilibrium 
price for riskless bonds is effectively equal to pB =θR. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. The logic of the proof is identical to that of the proof of Proposition 
2, except now the production structure pins down the intermediary’s wealth at t = 1, which is 
σ = 0. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4. If the intermediary carries no wealth at t = 1, namely σ = 0, there is no 
trading at t=1. Suppose instead that the intermediary carries all of his wealth at t=1, namely σ 
= 1. Then, after observing s there is no trading anyway, implying that E(Uinn|s) = w – θ·(yd – 
yr) and E(Πinn|s) = θ·R (1 + f 
L) + E(y) – (πg+ πd)yd – πryr. After observing s, investors sell all 
the new claims at pN1= ω
L·R so that they now obtain E(Uinn|s) = w – (θ – ω
L)R·f 
L, while the 




L + E(y). If σ = 0 then, innovation allows intermediaries to gain θ·yd – (πg+ πd)yd – πryr 
and investors to lose. θ·(yd – yr). If instead σ = 1, innovation allows intermediaries to gain on 
average Pr(s ){θ·yd  –[πg(s )+πd(s )]yd – πr(s )yr}+ Pr(s)(θ – ω
L)yd and investors to lose 
Pr(s)θ·(yd – yr) + Pr(s)(θ – ω
L)yd if σ = 1. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. By Lemma 3, without innovation the intermediary obtains E(Π) = 
wint + θ·R  – 1 if E
Ly < 1 and E(Π) = E(y)·[wint + θ·R – 1] if E
Ly ≥ 1. By Proposition 3, the 
intermediary innovates when E
Ly + (θ – 1) ·yd > 1. In the latter case, in the allocation of 
Proposition 3, the payoff obtained by the intermediary with innovation is on average equal to 








1 int .  By comparing this expression with 
the previous two equations describing the intermediary’s welfare absent innovation, it is 
immediate to find the conditions of Proposition 5. 
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